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Censorship as Textual Ellipsis: 
A Post-Structuralist Reading of the Censored Film 
G. Thomas Poe 
I. History, Textuality and "The Agency of the Censorship" 
The opening sequence of the quite forgotten (and deservedly so) 1934 
film Madame Du Barry displays a series of courtly paintings representing, in 
turn, the Kings of France from Louis X to Louis XV. While each of the 
paintings become increasingly elaborate, the final painting, that of Louis XV, 
is but an incomplete drawing within an otherwise empty frame. The sketch 
then dissolves into the film's opening scene where we first see the King, in all 
his glory, indeed, posing before a portrait artist. As I take it, the film thus 
promises, somewhat like Bazin's "myth of total cinema," to complete (in both 
senses of the word) the artist's sketch, that is, to offer a moving (again, in both 
senses of the word) portrait of Louis XV. And indeed, the scene continues 
with the King moving out from behind his royal garb while the majestic robes 
and crown remain freestanding. We have, now, standing before our eyes the 
little man who had previously been dwarfed within the representations of 
power. 
While Madame Du Barry is little more than a slight entertainment (in its 
case a mere sexual titillation), the film claims (in traditional Hollywood 
fashion) to be an historical biography. And thus the opening sequence of 
Madame Du Barry presents a site of representation wherein the claim is made 
that there is something called "real history" that stands behind artistic texts, and 
that can, therefore, be beckoned, like the little King, to step outside the text, 
to stand before us, to become the object of our gaze and the subject of our 
study. That this claim is made inside a film text that, itself, was subjected to 
the censoring agency ("agency" in both an institutional and rhetorical sense) of 
the film industry's Production Code Administration (functioning as an 
ideological apparatus) introduces a paradox I find inherent in the imbrication 
of history, textuality and censorship. For the King's portrait, as an artistic text, 
viewed from within the enlarged frarhe of the film as a censored text, suggests, 
I think, a metaphor, perhaps a metonym, or even, a mise en abîme for 
problems inherent in certain nineteenth century inspired historical-critical 
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methodologies wherein a like claim is made that history can be coerced to 
show itself outside of both textuality and ideology. 
In today's theoretical climate, both the epistomo-logical "a-theism" of 
post-structuralist-postmodern textual theory and the ideological "resignation" 
of certain post-Marxisms overlap to make me more than a little suspicious of 
claims that, like the little King in Madame Du Barry, the historical object (as 
subject for / to our gaze) can be called forth for all to see, leaving to one side 
its empty freestanding artistic representation. I am not convinced that in 
traditional historical-critical method, the historian is not, then, eschewing one 
"costume drama" for another. As "New Historicism" makes abundantly clear, 
we can no longer escape recognizing that history is, itself, "always already" a 
censored text. Consequently, the paradox inherent in the opening sequence of 
Madame Du Barry seems to lead to Jacques Derrida's famous (and, admittedly, 
to many, infamous) motto: "77 n'y a pas de hors-texte" ("There is nothing 
outside the text"). 
As loyal as I am to deconstruction as both a critical strategy and 
philosophical position (though, here, I want to make clear, philosophical 
position must be understood as a site from which one observes rather than as 
an act of positing a principle or proposition), both thoughtful and serious 
objections can be raised to the suggestion that there is nothing outside the text 
(or, as I read Derrida, nothing outside textuality). Certainly, numerous critics 
of Derrida (from traditional historians to classical Marxists, from bourgeois 
"protectors of the canon" to cultural materialists and neo-pragmatists) have, 
alike, protested that if there is nothing outside the text, then, first, 
deconstructive reading strategies are finally nothing more than an 
over-theorized "new criticism." And second (and, I believe, a more serious 
charge), deconstruction offers no way to move from inside a literary or film 
text into the "real" (effective) world of politics and history. And here, I am 
forced to agree with critics of deconstruction that, indeed, while history may 
only be a "text," a "site of representation," it is one within which real blood 
(not just ink or ketchup) is continually shed. 
Accordingly, such critics fear that deconstructive reading makes a fetish 
of the inside of discourse and thus cuts off the text's relationship with a 
political economy of knowledge and social practices. Thus, they complain, in 
deconstruction there is (I will use here, Burke's well-worn Pentad) no final 
effective Scene, Agent, Agency or Purpose. The text is read as only the Act 
of free floating signifiers. If this is the case, then indeed, deconstructive 
reading would seem forever confined within something like the Lacanian 
Imaginary, wherein all the reader can do is to chase the trace of the tale. 
And thus I have found myself, for some time now, caught (up) within the 
claims and counter-claims of both deconstruction and cultural studies. Yet, it 
is precisely at this point of oscillation within contemporary theory between 
deconstruction and a social critique of culture (which is, likewise, the 
oscillation between textuality and history) that I find my own theoretical 
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interest in the agency of censorship taking on a political urgency. For if, 
indeed, history is "always already" not only a text, but a censored text, then 
while history is "always" nothing but a text, it is a text "already" shaped, 
reshaped and misshaped by a political agency. That is to say, the politics of 
experience is "always already" the experience of politics. 
Then textuality and history are, alike (in a psychoanalytic sense) 
secondary formulations. And, here, in this essay, exploring the nature of 
censorship, you and I are attempting to go further, trying to get at some kind 
of primary process (the agency of a political unconscious), a process that is, at 
once, psychic and political, individual and collective, a primary process active 
within textuality, itself, (whether as literature, or film, or for that matter, 
culture and history understood as "text"). 
What makes this discussion of censorship as a primary process so difficult 
is that, here, we are forced to try to tease out a process that is the very stuff 
of textuality (that is, censorship creates textuality, but there would be no 
censorship except for the existence of the text upon which it operates). In one 
sense, the agency of censorship is of the text, and, indeed, nothing but the text 
(it is, after all, nothing but a textual operation); in another sense, as a primary 
process, it is always already an operation outside the text. Thus censorship as 
a primary process is, as Metz notes, "literally, beyond our grasp since we can 
only grasp it by making it conscious." And, so, as Metz continues: 
no one can "get hold of the primary process since to do so would 
involve reducing it entirely to secondary formulations. That is why 
it is something we point to (rather than define) in phrases which are 
essentially deictic, in negative and relational terms, as a kind of 
desecondarised secondary. . . . 
The horizon of the "primary" is only the dialectical other of 
secondarisation: its limit, its point of disappearance, and at the same 
time its work, its creation. The primary is the name secondarisation 
gives to the holes in its fabric.1 
. And to bend Metz, I trust only slightly, to meet my own needs, I would, 
then, add: that the political unconscious (here, understood as "the agency of 
the censorship," is only the dialectical other of history as a process of 
"secondarisation," (that is, of textualization). The primary process of 
censorship is, then, the name history is now compelled to give to the holes in 
its fabric. 
Censorship, then, operates something like what Lotman terms a "minus 
device," that is, the "non-utilization of some element, its meaningful 
absence . . . [which] becomes an organic part of the graphically fixed 
text . . . an unfinished construction in a finished text."2 The agency of 
censorship, in its creation of the text as a series of displacements, creates, at 
the same time, a text wherein the meaning which is present is created by (and 
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dependent upon) a "meaning-full absence" of meaning. And, I might add, it 
is to the credit of deconstruction that it insists that we read the "meaningful 
absence" within the text as, indeed, full of meaning. So, of course, in one 
sense, it is still possible, even necessary, to continue to talk about "what the 
text means." At the same time, we cannot escape a realization that what the 
text "means" to say is the product of what it cannot say. As the product of 
censorship, meaning is surely present in the text. But, but as an always already 
displaced meaning, it resides in the text as a negative quality. Something has 
been erased, has disappeared (though not without a trace). An ellipsis creates 
an ellipse. 
In fact, it is Derrida who has most usefully explored the elliptic nature of 
textuality. He claims that at the non-symmetrical division of the closure of the 
book and the opening of the text, there, one finds an "elliptical essence." As 
Derrida writes, "this lack is invisible and undeterminable . . . yet all meaning 
is altered by this lack. . . Something is missing that would make the circle 
perfect."3 Then, on the one hand, there is "nothing outside the text;" on the 
other hand, that which is missing (ellipsed) from (thereby forced outside) the 
text shapes the text into an ellipsoid [a deviation from perfect circular or 
spherical form]. This, I would argue, is the dialectic tension within which one 
must read a censored film and further, much further, it is, perhaps, the very 
dialectic tension which already exists between history and textuality. 
Perhaps, then, critics of Derrida misread, and thus too easily dismiss, 
Derrida's famous aphorism by putting all the stress on the word "text": "there 
is nothing outside the TEXT." Perhaps we should read it as, "there IS nothing 
outside the text"/"there is NOTHING outside the text." There is something, 
which is a no-thing, outside the text, at the heart of the text. (Like the 
negative theology of Meister Eckhart, Derrida seems to create, here, 
something like a negative Logos). The task before us, then, is to explore the 
nature of the "nothing," this NO-THING that is of the text, but outside the 
text, that unstabilizes the text, that makes'its meaning undecidable. It is the 
NO-THING that acts through the agency of censorship, as something akin to 
a minus device. 
II. Censorship and Cultural Rhetoric 
Nevertheless-and yet-on the other hand-to give Derrida's critics their 
due, the valid concerns they voice force me to, at the same time invoke a 
double reading of the phrase "agency of censorship," one that creates a degree 
of resonance between the various contextual meanings of "agency" and 
"censorship" within the discourses of rhetorical, psychoanalytic and textual 
theory and its use as a signifier of quite real and historical political-institutional 
practices. As we have seen, in the case of Madame Du Barry, the Production 
Code Administration is quite literally an "agency" whose job is to "censor" 
cultural texts. And here, film theory clearly crosses paths with film history. 
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Indeed, the study of censorship stands at the axis of film theory and film 
history. In fact, just such a double reading of censorship has already begun in 
the recent work of several theoretically-minded film historians and/or 
historically-minded film theorists (Annette Kuhn, Lea Jacobs, Dana Polan and 
Janet Staiger immediately come to mind) as they seek to read the social logic 
of a particular time and place within the textual logic which produces the film's 
text. For example, in her analysis of The Big Sleep, Kuhn uses a double 
reading of the Freudian notion of censorship alongside its meaning as a set of 
institutional practices to explore the relationship of a film text to its production 
context. Kuhn attempts to move away from, as she puts it: 
the model of the image/text as an isolated concept of analysis, and 
closer to a conception of the image as inhabiting various contexts: 
cultural contexts of spectatorship, institutional and social/historical 
context of production and consumption . . . without losing sight of 
texts as productive of meaning in their own right.4 
In this essay, I make a like move, searching out the circular movement in 
which a film text is produced by a social logic which produces a textual logic 
within which viewers produce various meanings which, in turn, circulate as 
social logic. Yes, it is a dizzying process. But thus the text is both a product 
and agent of a "cultural rhetoric," defined by Steven Mailloux as "the political 
effectivity of trope and argument in culture."5 What is particularly productive 
in Mailloux's definition is that, here, the word "rhetoric" brings to mind a 
double scene. First, rhetoric is understood as a textual logic (the structuring 
of texts through tropes), a textual logic that can be opened up by 
deconstruction as both a philosophical and critical position (again, recall how 
I mean position). And second, rhetoric is understood as a social logic (reading 
the text as a site of argument (we can use, here, argument in both its classical 
and popular sense: argument as ideology and argument as a site of conflict 
over ideology). Rhetoric, then, as argument, as a social logic, can, likewise, be 
revealed by the use of deconstruction as a political strategy. 
In my reading of the following censored films, I will, then, be reading 
censorship as both a textual and social logic that operates both in and as 
cultural rhetoric. And here, I bring forth two "arguments" of my own. First, 
just as every text is a censored and thus conflicted text, the social logic in 
which the Hollywood film is formed is the site of a conflict (of drives?) 
between its function as an ideological apparatus and its necessity to entertain, 
to produce pleasure (and I do not believe these two operations are necessarily 
one and the same). Second, in seeing what is going on in a film's text, we are 
able to better understand what is going on in the social formation within which 
the text is a transcoding. And likewise, to deconstruct the censored text is to 
deconstruct a censored social formation, that is, to listen for what the 
unconscious (that meaningful absence) of history speaks. In making such a 
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move, we listen within the mechanistic hum of the agency/apparatus of 
censorship, for a distant echo of displaced discourses and desires that may yet 
still speak, if we can learn to listen within the "derivatives of the unconscious" 
for a return of the sup-(re)pressed. 
III. Madame Du Barry (1934) 
As Greg Black tells us, when Joseph Breen first laid eyes upon Warner 
Brothers' script for Madame Du Barry, his anxious response was to declare it 
filled with "vulgarity, obscenity and blatant adultery." The script was, Breen 
decried, "dangerous from the standpoint of industry policy . . . too much 
exposure of the female body would lower the moral standards of the 
audience." Before the film could be screened to the public, the Production 
Code Administration would order twenty-six cuts.6 I recount this historical 
scene within which Madame Du Barry came to the screen, as it repeats another 
scene, a prior moment of shock that, likewise, activated an agency of 
censorship. As Sarah Kofman notes, Freud, in writing the Traumdeutung (The 
Interpretation of Dreams): 
exposed for the first time this thing so horrible to see, this thing that 
could not be directly looked at, the sex of the mother-horrible in 
its desirability. Freud is constrained by the dread of having to blind 
himself . . . to elaborate pseudo-solutions, the fictions which screen 
[italics mine] the unobservable and which transforms woman into a 
never-solvable enigma.7 
What is "this thing so horrible to see . . . horrible in its desirability" that forces 
some Superego, some Symbolic No of the "Name of the Father," the "agency 
(the instance) of the censorship," to demand that both Freud and Breen take 
up the knife, put scissors in hand-and make the cut? Companions in the 
dark, Freud and Breen both create texts saturated with the enigma of woman. 
When we watch the final cut of Madame Du Barry, we see projected on 
the screen the PCA approved text of the film as indeed a "secondary revision," 
in both a literal and psychoanalytic sense. As Laplanche and Pontalis explain, 
secondary revision is an "effect of the censorship . . . the filling-in of its gaps 
by means of selection and addition . . . In this sense [it] may be said to 
resemble rationalization."8 I would add, then, that as an "effect of the 
censorship," secondary revision and ideology act as one and the same. They, 
alike, attempt to construct (as we, now, attempt to deconstruct) "elaborate 
pseudo-solutions, the fictions which screen the unobservable." 
The censoring of Madame Du Barry, as the ideological closure of 
secondary revision thus ever "screens the unobservable" by the projecting of a 
"screen memory" ("a formation produced by a compromise between repressed 
elements and defense").9 And yet, as a deconstructive reading of Madame Du 
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Barry reveals, the film text screens (in both senses of the word: to obfuscate 
and to project-reveal-show) fissures and contradictions the agency of 
censorship attempts to efface. It is in this double act of screening that the 
CountesS'Madame Du Barry (both the woman and the film) are, alike, 
transformed into never-solvable enigmas. 
The enigma of Madame Du Barry is produced by the agency of censorship 
expelling outside the text explicit views of the body of the woman and the 
scenes of the King and the Countess together in bed. The cuts produce a lack, 
the loss from the text of both the full-bodied presence of the woman and the 
primal scene. And yet, as psychoanalytic theory insists, it is precisely in the 
denial and loss of full-bodied presence that the indeterminable desire of 
obsession and fetish is born. Forbidden to look at the body of the Other, 
("horrible in its desirability") a substitution is made, a secondary site is 
established within an hysterical blindness. The absent is returned to presence 
in/as an act of oscillating substitution. This oscillating nature of the fetish was 
first noted by Freud who found the fetish both a disavowal and an affirmation. 
Likewise, it is the theme of the fetish as an "indecidable oscillation" that is 
crossed and crisscrossed throughout Derrida's Glas (As Derrida quotes Genet, 
"my excitement is the oscillation").10 
As is well known, since Laura Mulvey's original work on visual pleasure 
in the classic cinema, the fetishization of the female body has been a key 
concern in film theory. Mulvey and most feminist film theory to date believe 
the image of the woman (captured within the male gaze of the camera) is 
made a fetish to defuse a castration threat and Oedipal guilt. Thus the cut 
that precedes and produces the fetish is the cut of castration. Recently, 
however, Gaylyn Studlar, in her study of the von Sternberg-Dietrich films and 
following her lead, Tony Williams, in his work on film noir, question the 
castration centered Freudian-Lacanian base of Mulvey's theory.11 Studlar, 
indebted to Deleuze, suggests that the fetish represents a substitute for the 
mother's lost breast and body. In this realignment of psychoanalytic theory, 
we might then conclude that the unkindest cut is not the castrating cut that 
creates woman as the site of loss or lack, but the cutting of the umbilical cord, 
the cut that produces the woman's body, not as loss but as forever—lost. 
In Studlar's formulation, the pre-oedipal fetish produces what Deleuze 
identifies as the neglected (censored) "masochistic aesthetic." And here, 
Studlar's study seems to more adequately capture the oscillating nature of the 
fetish noted by Derrida in Glas and displayed (screened) in Madame Du 
Barry. Studlar describes the masochistic aesthetic as making an obsessive 
movement between "revelation and concealment, appearance and 
disappearance, rejection and seduction."12 In a like manner, the PCA, in acting 
as a parental agency of censorship (the "law of the Father") prevents the 
camera, as the eye of the child, to be fully reunited with the body of the 
mother. And thus, the body of the Other is produced as a fetish, the 
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oscillating presence/absence of the Mother in her "revelation and concealment, 
appearance and disappearance, rejection and seduction." 
And indeed, the first time the presence of Madame du Barry appears on 
screen, she hides behind a curtain, only, suggestively, revealing-her foot! 
When the King first sees the Madame, she conceals herself within her coach, 
only holding out-her hand. And in the film's first full shot of Madame du 
Barry, she peeks out from under her bed covers, smiles seductively at the 
camera, then, suddenly pulls the covers over her head. In the first three 
sequences in which she appears (and disappears), the Madame plays a cruel 
hide and seek with the camera. Rather than being captured by (within) the 
camera's gaze, she, instead, like the striptease artist, sadistically creates and 
controls a masochistic desire within the King, the camera and the audience, by 
playing her fort-da game, hiding and revealing then hiding again-the fullness 
of the mother. 
In the "masochistic" film text, it is not fear of castration but the excessive 
fullness of the mother ("horrible in its desirability") that elicits that mixture of 
desire and fear that oscillates within the fetish. And, indeed, the fetishistic 
nature of the text as revised and approved by the PCA seems to produce just 
such an oscillation between fear and desire, which displays itself in the 
oscillation of two discourses: one discourse approved by the PCA and another 
that keeps insistently speaking from within the text. The first, the discourse of 
the "agency of the censorship" speaks of Woman as castration, lack, threat: 
The Whore. Yet, a second discourse, a discourse of desire, speaks of the 
whore as fullness, excess: The Mother. 
Breen sees the Madame as a whore to be censored. The King (and thus 
the audience, for the king and camera's position- [point-of-view] are 
emotionally aligned—desire puts both at the mercy of the fetish) seeks her out 
as a child longs for the Mother. And, certainly, the Madame brings out the 
child in the King. The Madame, in fact, acts within the text, something like 
Derrida's reading of Plato's pharmakon, as both poison and cure. The film's 
text, then, is made the site of a conflict between cinema as an ideological 
apparatus (the discourse as shaped by the PCA) and as an entertainment, as 
a provider of pleasure (the Madame as fetish). Split by this battle between a 
cinematic Super-Ego and its Id, the film text, like the fetish, oscillates between 
a denial and affirmation of Woman, Excess and Desire. In Madame Du Barry, 
we find, then, two discourses on woman, one of poison and one of cure. And 
following a deconstructive path, we can, perhaps, search out how and where 
these two discourses counter-act. 
Black's careful research shows how the PCA, still ill at ease following the 
script's final cuts, had Warner Brothers add a prologue to the film that would, 
they hoped, stabilize oscillation by establishing a "dominant" discourse, the 
discourse of woman and desire as poison, not cure. Yet, the PCA's use of the 
"Prologue" as a strategy of containment (both ideological and sexual, if they 
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are not one and the same) seems only to produce, instead, a moment of aporia 
(a dialectical shock) that only foregrounds a text at war with itself. 
The "Prologue" declares: 
. . . Extravagance and Folly had succeeded at last in arousing in the 
breast of the Common People the smoldering embers of Resentment 
and Revolt. 
The PCA seems to trust that if it can make the film appear to be more about 
"politics" (indeed, even politics as "Resentment and Revolt"), than about "sex," 
then the text will be less dangerous to the well-being of, not only American 
society, but given the worldwide distribution of Hollywood products-the 
"civilized world." I would assume bourgeois ideology is protected, here, from 
"Resentment and Revolt" by keeping the two ever separate from the twin evils 
of "Extravagance and Folly." It seems a mark of ideological containment, 
bourgeois and otherwise (certainly in many strains of Marxism), that 
"extravagance and folly" are squarely encoded with the paradigm of "Things 
That Are Evil." Of course, it never quite works that way. Extravagance and 
folly seem to always slip their paradigmatic bonds and in Hollywood films, 
perhaps, more than anywhere! (Few of us in our youth failed to note that in 
Hollywood films the "evil" characters are [and had] the most fun.) 
Still, both a dour Christianity and a stern Marxism, alike, have sought to 
contain "extravagant" visions of a Utopian future. Even Louis XV's court can't 
hold a candle to the early Christians' depiction of a future kingdom, open to 
the poor where streets would be extravagantly paved with gold and populated 
by prostitutes. The PCA may grasp better than most Marxists that within the 
"political unconscious," such dreams are less an "opiate" than a stimulant. I am 
reminded here of the startling truth of Adorno's observation that: 
[humanistic] criticism . . . furthers the belief that the sin lies in man's 
desire for consumer goods and not in the organization of the whole 
which withholds these goods from man. . . . The sin is satiety, not 
hunger. . . . [Thus] the "eternal values" of which cultural criticism 
is so fond reflect the perennial catastrophe.13 
I will not argue, then, with Joseph Breen's assessment that the text of 
Madame Du Barry, this (w)hor(e')s texte that reveals and conceals, appears 
and disappears, rejects and seduces, is dangerous in its "indecidable 
oscillation." For everywhere the film seems to ache to break its social contract 
with the PCA and to validate extravagance and folly over reason and 
rationality. For both the King and the Madame, sin is inscribed as hunger, 
not satiety. The King is dying of hunger, the hunger to be free from the 
trap-mgs of patriarchal power. And while the ideological frame produced by 
the PCA induced "Prologue" insists that "this picture portrays a King unmindful 
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of his people-selfish, arrogant, unscrupulous," the King declares himself, "the 
unhappiest man in Europe," who seems well aware that his problems are the 
result of bearing the too heavy weight of patriarchy. (And for all the PCA's 
efforts, the film's point-of-view clearly positions us within the text as 
sympathetic to his plight.) He cries, "Must I always be King? Is there no 
woman who will think of me only as a man?" This is a King longing to be 
deposed. 
And as well, the King's hunger to be dispossessed of his power is 
matched by his Madame's hunger to forget the poverty of her youth, to relish 
in what she defends as the "righteousness" of satiety. When a liberal and 
progressive advisor to the King accuses Madame du Barry of insensitivity to 
the plight of the poor, her innocent, childlike response is, "Why do you hate 
me? Am I so cruel to be trying to have fun and to make the King happy? Is 
that so wicked?" Speaking for myself, a liberal, a progressive and a humanist, 
the question the Madame throws back in my face is a hard one to answer. 
For Breen, it was easy; the answer is a decided YES! However, the film's 
text, itself, seems not so sure, and on balance may be read to answer NO! 
In fact, there appears throughout the film a pull toward a transvaluation 
of all patriarchal, bourgeois values. Thus within the text's economy of values, 
the King values the "feminine" work of cooking and sewing over the 
"masculine" work of ruling the nation (the only time the King seems happy is 
when he is displaying his expertise in "cooking and needlework"). Just as, 
having a mistress is valued over marriage and family (the King's daughters are 
all harpies who only bring him misery) and, indeed, marriage is described as 
"a loud pretending, and for what?" Sexual pleasure is valued over the pleasure 
of making war (in one nonsensical scene, du Barry's sexual escapades actually 
prevent France from going to war). While at the same time, the sexual and 
political impotence of the King's grandson is blamed on an overly "rationalistic 
education" that has produced a "mechanical mind." The first time the 
grandson is shown on the screen, his head is stuck in an elaborate, mechanical 
clock (he appears something like a nineteenth century "bachelor machine"). 
And here the solution, quite genuinely recommended (right in the face of 
Breen and company) is to have the stupid boy study pornography rather than 
philosophy and science followed by a night in Madame du Barry's bed! 
Throughout the film, (forbidden) pleasure is valued over politics, and it would 
appear, offered as its cure. 
In an oscillation of both dismay and wonderment over the excesses of 
Madame du Barry, the inquiry is made: "Madame, what are you trying to do 
to France?" She turns her eyes away from the King, and addressing the 
camera, breaks frame and replies, "Just what it is doing to me!" What can she 
mean? Several possibilities, one in particular, come to mind, but to take the 
question literally, just what has France done to the Madame, save by 
withholding its goods, turned her into a sexual outlaw who now takes 
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everything she can get, who displays before all the people of France the 
extravagance of satiety? 
Ah, Mr. Breen was so right. The excess of Madame Du Barry, like the 
excess of Woman and the promise of fullness, of satiety, is indeed dangerous, 
"horrible in its desirability." And so, the text of history (or at least myth) tells 
us a revolution comes to France when the hungry of Paris hear Marie 
Antoinette's disdainful words, "Let them eat cake." A wiser woman, the 
whore, Madame du Barry, would, I think, have known the revolutionary 
potential of those words. Her every action declares: Let me eat cake! Let 
them eat cake! Let us all eat cake! Madame du Barry makes the suggestion, 
one Breen and his ilk might well fear: revolutions are not caused, alone, by 
a want for bread, but out of a desire for cake. 
IV. Dead End (1937) 
In bringing Sidney Kingsley's Broadway hit, Dead End, to the screen, 
Samuel Goldwyn saw the opportunity to produce a film he believed would 
make a significant contribution to the public welfare. Goldwyn went so far as 
to claim that Kingsley's drama was "one of the greatest social documentaries 
ever written."14 Despite Goldwyn's Hollywood hyperbole and in spite of PCA 
interference, Dead End is undoubtedly a deeply felt and politically progressive 
film, making not only a diagnosis, but offering a prescription, as well, for the 
ills of urban poverty. The film's prescription for alleviating the misery of 
depression era poverty is, no doubt, made easier to take by having it delivered 
by the film's "All American Hero." Our hero is the Hollywood creation 
replacing the play's central character, the ricket-crippled "Gimpty," who has 
now been transfigured into a young, strapping and handsome college educated, 
but unemployed, architect named-Dave. And so, our new hero, Dave, 
declares: "give people a decent place to live and they'll be decent." 
Certainly, Dave's message was not missed by The New York Post which 
wrote, "This is a movie about housing."15 One trade paper declared Dead End 
a "potent sermon, exerting a deterring influence on youngsters who desire to 
emulate the lives . . . of gangsters."16 And thus, not only did numerous church 
and "women's groups" back the film, but the Legion of Decency listed the film 
as "recommended." The PCA, itself, after, of course, some changes, praised 
the film as "a strong plea for slum elimination and better housing as a crime 
prevention."17 
I have wanted to foreground, here, what John Fiske terms a film's 
"vertical intertextuality" (a primary text's relationship to other texts which refer 
specifically to it [reviews, publicity, studio or industry files, etc.] and which 
directly and indirectly shape the film's reception).18 In doing so it becomes 
clear that after Kingsley's play had been tidied up (first by screen writer Lillian 
Hellman, and still later by the PCA) Dead End was finally viewed by decent 
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people to be a decent film that made a strong plea for human decency as 
defined by Dave: "give people a decent place to live and they'll be decent." 
Within the circularity of the above logic, one can begin to see why the 
PCA would embrace Dead End. Dave and Joseph Breen think a lot alike and 
share a common goal. Like Dave's argument for housing, the PCA believes: 
give people a decent film to watch and they'll be decent. Since everyone 
surrounding the making, distribution and reception of Dead End seems so 
obsessed with decency, I wonder if it might be wise to take a closer look at 
just how "decency" is articulated in what can be (quite fairly) termed a 
"progressive" text. 
Dead End begins with the camera placing us high above the roof tops of 
Manhattan's East Side. The camera thus makes literal the text's 
point-of-view: that the viewers come to the film as naturally, originally, 
normally, far removed from the slums of New York. We descend into a street 
scene we would normally "overlook," as indeed, at the end of the film the 
camera (and we) will ascend (return) back to our natural, original, normal, 
lofty position. As the camera moves down toward the city streets, it slices 
between the luxury apartments of the rich and the tenements of the poor, that 
alike, line the city's river. And so the film begins by visualizing its theme, the 
indecent division between a society's rich and poor. 
It was Michel Foucault, was it not, who taught us to be suspicious of just 
such (as he termed them) "dividing practices?"19 Foucault devoted much of his 
energy to exploring how a long tradition of humanitarian rhetoric on reform 
and progress (like Dead End, no doubt well meaning and progressive) 
nevertheless, by first dividing, then "moralizing the poor," functions as a 
technique of power/knowledge and domination. And it is with Foucault's 
work in mind that I grow equally suspicious of the rhetoric of "decency" that 
resounds both within and around Dead End. The film's argument seems less 
one that claims that poverty is, in itself, indecent, than that poverty creates 
people who befrave indecently (and thus Dave's declaration that "decent 
housing will make people decent," or the PCA's approval of the film as one 
which makes "a strong plea for better housing as a crime prevention," or The 
Motion Picture Daily's praise of Dead End as "a potent sermon"). With all this 
concern for making people decent, crime prevention and deterring youth from 
going astray, I wonder if the division the film creates isn't one between 
economic class and conditions, but rather, more a division between decent and 
indecent behavior. If so, I am not too surprised since much, if not most, of 
our cultural rhetoric has continued up to the present "War" on drugs and crime 
to articulate interrelated questions of class, race and economic deprivation 
within the paradigmatics of morality. 
In the case of Dead End, a division is marked between the insensitivity of 
the very rich (in American media texts insensitivity is a mark of the very rich, 
generally depicted as "indecently rich," while the middle-class stays, of course, 
decently well-off) and the violent and/or morally illegitimate behavior of the 
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film's gangsters, the prostitute, Francey, and "The Dead End Kids." The text's 
dividing practices, then, create a semiotic site which serves, at the same time, 
as a middle ground within the film's dividing practices. This "middle" ground 
between the class-iRed behaviors of both the very rich and the very poor is a 
site created by and for Dave and his honest and hard working girlfriend, 
Drina. And in counter-distinction to the film's other characters (both rich and 
poor) Dave and Drina are constructed as, yes, poor, but more importantly, 
decent folk who long to work hard and move out of poverty. We start to 
perceive, here, something akin to that classic strategy of ideological 
containment identified by Barthes as "ex-nomination." In doing so, Barthes 
explored how the category ("regime") of the bourgeoisie as an "ideological 
fact," refuses to be named.20 And thus the discourse of the bourgeoisie masks 
itself as "common sense," or in this case, a "common ground" created and 
reserved for Dave, Drina and, of course, we the viewers. In Dead End, the 
discourse of Dave and Drina seems to act, to represent (stand in for), the 
ex-nominated voice of the bourgeoisie masked in a rhetoric concerned with 
"decency." 
We see something of this in the way Dave and Drina's work ethic shows 
up the idleness and indecency of both the rich and poor. As inscribed by the 
film, the progeny of idle wealth is the "sissy," the progeny of idle poverty is the 
juvenile delinquent who becomes the criminal. But, by the end of the film, as 
a reward for their decency, Dave, Drina and her young brother, a reformed 
Tommy, will be transformed into a nuclear family unit, the backbone and 
source of strength (as we are so often reminded) of American capitalism 
articulated as a "moral value." In somewhat of a vicious cycle, Dave's 
"decency" is rewarded in that Dave's hard work (he kills a gangster) provides 
money (he receives a "reward") so that he can spare Drina and Tommy from 
the injustice (indecency) of poverty (Dave will save Tommy from prison by 
using the reward money to get him the best lawyer, as Dave puts it-- "money 
can buy.") 
We see something of the same going on in an interesting subplot 
concerning the neighbor gangster, "Baby Face" Nelson. Baby Face has 
returned to his home turf, at least in part, to see his mother. But when Baby 
Face goes to his mother, she rejects him, addressing her son as "You dirty 
dog!" When Baby Face tells his sidekick about his mother's reaction, the 
sidekick simply replies: "I give my mother a little money and she's always 
glad to see me." The real sin, what creates our antipathy to Baby Face, seems 
less the source of his ill-gotten gain than how he spends it. Unlike Dave who 
kills a man and uses the money to save Tommy, Baby Face, like the rich, is 
shown up as stingy and selfish. I wonder if it is not a mark of bourgeois 
discourse to articulate morality as a question not of how one makes money, 
but how one spends it. Bourgeois morality, then, is finally a consumer ethic. 
Nevertheless (again, there is always a nevertheless) for all the work of 
just such strategies of ideological containment, like censorship itself, there 
200 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
would be no need for containment if eradication was a possibility. That which 
must be contained, like the unconscious, still speaks in displacement and 
condensation, in metonym and metaphor. As Lacan insisted: "it speaks." 
Thus, as always, there is a joker in the deck, one that unsettles the text's 
dividing practices and ex-nominating operations. The joker, here, is the 
disrupting presence of "The Dead End Kids." 
Brought to Hollywood from the Broadway play, The Dead End Kids 
became (even before the release of the film) a media sensation. Throughout 
the shooting of the picture, the press gleefully reported the "rowdy" (Time 
magazine's word) behavior of the boys, portraying them as if they were real 
life lower class delinquents "discovered" on the streets of New York (they were 
not; in fact, the boys were from middle class families and chosen for the 
Broadway play out of several well known drama schools, but with help from 
the press and no doubt to the credit of their acting talent, no one seemed to 
have cared to believe the truth). Ironically, due to the publicity and the PCA's 
insistence that overtly crude and violent behavior be elided from the film's 
depiction of juvenile delinquency (thus making them "loveable" rowdies) when 
the film was released the Dead End Kids became a popular sensation. 
The result, from what I can tell, was that Dead End was received by the 
public as much (or more) a vehicle for the carnivalesque, billingsgate-like 
antics of the Kids than "as one of the greatest social documents ever written." 
Time magazine, in fact, devoted as much space to a recounting of the Kids' 
antics in Hollywood as it did to its review of the film. And in its review Time 
declared, "the gang . . . contributed most of the noise and all the excitement 
to the show . . . the whole dirty, ruthless, gay, heroic, nasty, sadistic crew of 
them."21 
In coming to terms with Dead End, for all the ways Foucault and Barthes 
shed light on the textual operations that produce the text, the dirty, ruthless, 
gay, heroic, nasty, sadistic antics of the Kids may lead us on to Bakhtin. The 
boys' carnivalesque b.ehavior produces an indecidability in the text. Dead End, 
finally, seems unable to decide just how we are to relate to the Kids, as victims 
of social injustice or as appealing characters precisely because they, alone, are 
free of the very middle-class decency the film so desperately upholds. 
Dead End reflects an ambiguity concerning "juvenile delinquent" that runs 
through both American history and literature, one that, I suspect, leads to the 
fact that subversive, revolutionary discourse has so often been transcoded into 
books and films about "youth gangs" and juvenile delinquency. In the "gang," 
there is both the echo of a carnivalesque freedom from the constraints of 
middle-class decency and at least the whisper (a trace) of a "class for [as well 
as in] itself."22 (The role of a trans-national youth culture, inscribed in music 
and fashion, in the political upheavals of the old Soviet Block, as well as China 
has yet to be written). And, in fact, the repressed roots of the Dead End Kids 
(later re-named The Bowery Boys) are, indeed, less innocent and more 
threatening to social order than one might suspect. In the 1850s a gang of 
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10-year-old boys known as "The Little Bowery Boys" committed a number of 
murders in New York, and, as well, a boys gang known as the "Five Pointers" 
(a name that shows up in later Bowery Boys films) sacked and burned much 
of New York during the Draft Riots of 1863!23 
Of course, not so radical~our "Bowery Boys"! Still, the carnivalesque 
subversiveness of their discourse does work to unsettle the platitudes of Dave 
and Drina. The presence of the Dead End Kids at least confronts the film's 
sociological analysis with voices (a discourse) that comes from somewhere 
outside humanism. The Kid's earthy language brings to mind Ken Hirschkop's 
criticism of cultural and sociological theory, one that parallels the final failure 
of ideological closure in Dead End. As Hirschkop notes: 
attempts to connect the languages of "everyday life" with sociological 
analysis leads to the reification of the former by the latter. The gap 
between them marks the place of a necessary but absent 
inter-mediary between the texture of life in civil society and the 
scientific aspirations of social theory.24 
The Dead End Kids, if nothing else, reconnect Dead End to the 
(concrete) languages of everyday life. As Bakhtin asserted, "the pleasures of 
carnival are not the pleasures of mere talk but those of a discourse which has 
rediscovered its connection to the concrete."25 And if the dividing practices of 
Dead End attempt to build a mythic "logic of the concrete,"26 the laughing, 
taunting, singing discourse of the boys gives voice to a liberating il-"logic of the 
concrete." While Dave, Drina, Baby Face, the cops on the beat and the 
gangsters, indeed, all the adult characters in the film, are portrayed as victims 
trying desperately, each in their own way, to escape the misery of their lives, 
the Dead End Kids appear to have nothing such in mind. When the Kids 
taunt the rich boy who lives in the adjoining high-priced high-rise it is not, 
after all, a cry for equal access to his French lessons, nor to swim in the rich 
boy's (bragged about) private indoor pool. No, they'll take the garbage strewn 
river over a sanitized pool any day. So I don't think the Kids would be pleased 
at all with the plans Messers. Kingsley, Goldwyn and Breen, or Ms. Hellman 
had in mind. I suspect that with another juvenile delinquent named Huck, our 
Kids would "head out for the Territory ahead of the rest, because aunt Sally" 
[I suppose, here, aunt Lillian] "she's going to adopt me and sivilize me and I 
can't stand it. I been there before."27 
Now before I rhapsodize over the carnavelesque nature of popular culture 
too much, I readily admit that just such a populist tradition can and surely has 
been used to do the work of an ideology that upholds a certain "poor but 
happy" (like the "happy slave") Menippean discourse that serves mostly you 
know who! Nevertheless, I don't think one can dismiss Huck Finn that easily, 
and while The Dead End Kids are no match to Huck in textual subversiveness, 
I also doubt one can dismiss their presence in the film as nothing more than 
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a strategy of containment. But I suppose that is my point, here again is the 
oscillation, where the text is at war with itself, where the film becomes, like I 
believe every text, finally, a site of ideological conflict with itself, reflecting a 
culture at conflict with itself. Ideologies, like censorship, like strategies of 
containment, never, finally, have their own way. 
While it is hard to say how much of an impact Dead End, as "a potent 
sermon," had, finally, on lessening the desire of youngsters to emulate 
gangsters, or to provide better housing as a crime prevention, it is clear that 
the popularity of the Dead End Kids caused nearly every studio to produce 
their own "kid gang" series. And the Dead End Kids themselves stayed on in 
Hollywood to make eighty-nine films from 1938 to 1958.28 Few, if any, of their 
films were reviewed by "legitimate" critics (nor are they, presently, studied by 
many "serious" film scholars). Their films, like the other studio's kid gang 
series, mostly flattered their teen target audience by proclaiming that kids are 
always smarter, more competent and "right" than adults who are always 
dumber, incompetent and "wrong." The Dead End Kids' films contain 
dialogue like that found in their 1941 Hit the Road: one of the boys replies 
to the moral instruction of a social worker: "I've heard so much of that 
baloney I could eat it with mustard." In the 1940 You're Not So Tough, Huntz 
Hall declares, "Look what you got us into, jobs!" 
Given the long staying power of the Dead End Kids/Bowery Boys, 
regardless of what either Mr. Goldwyn or the PCA had in mind, many in the 
audience of Dead End took their pleasure in the boys' escape from decency, 
their ability to "run fast" before the PCA "sivilizes" them because, as we all 
know, "we've been there before." 
V. Gabriel Over the White House (1933) 
In producing Gabriel Over the White House, William Randolph Hearst 
must have been enthusiastic over the prospect of freeing his political views 
from the confines of the editorial pages, to frame them within the narrative of 
a popular film. Certainly, the narrative structure of Gabriel appears to have 
been devised to provide a structure within which to string together a number 
of political speeches, really, dramatized editorials (while Walter Wanger and 
Carey Wilson wrote the story and dialogue, Hearst, in fact, wrote the film's 
speeches). These dramatized editorials offer, then, America and the world the 
benefit of Hearst's wisdom on such disparate subjects as unemployment, crime, 
the failure of prohibition, foreign debt and disarmament. And thus, as Gabriel 
unreels, one gets the uncomfortable feeling that a more appropriate title for 
Mr. Hearst's fantasy would be, "If I Were King." 
From the opening moments of the film, with the inauguration of party 
hack Jud Hammond as President of the United States, political parties and 
"professional" (Washington "insiders") politicians are portrayed as the root of 
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the country's woes, thus articulating a populist rhetoric used more recently, 
and more deftly by Ronald Reagan. 
And, in fact, the opening few sequences of the film (that is, before 
Hammond is transfigured into "one of the greatest men who ever lived") offers 
the opportunity for some rather jejune, but still entertaining political satire. 
It is fun to see Hammond's total lack of preparation for the job (he asks his 
secretary, "Where is Siam?"). Even worse, he employs his mistress, a Miss 
Pendola Malloy (he affectionately calls her Tend/*) as his very "private" 
secretary. The film's early scenes end with Hammond being portrayed as 
nothing more than a little boy playing on the floor of the White House Office. 
Oddly, though, in spite of (and I suspect, more tellingly, because of) the 
president's total incompetence and "immorality," he comes across as a rather 
likable subject for light satire. As Greg Black shows, this is partly the result 
of PCA involvement in re-writing the film. The PCA evidently preferred the 
president to be pictured as more immature than downright sinister (The New 
York Times reported that the original script had Hammond more insulting and 
bombastic.)29 And, possibly, beyond the question of direct censorship, I 
wonder if populist rhetoric doesn't tend to transcode incompetence into 
likability (recently, and more deftly . . .). 
Now, it seems to be that as long as Gabriel Over the White House stays a 
(mildly) entertaining satiric comedy, the film at least resists its own inclination 
toward ideological closure (a sort of textual hardening of the arteries). 
Comedy requires that the audience's laugh complete the text. (Thus, while 
a television comedy is played before a studio audience or uses a laugh track, 
a "serious" drama more fully completes itself.) Comedy, then, foregrounds the 
dialogic nature of a text by creating within the text, itself, a space in which it 
must pause, wait and listen for the voice of an other (a laugh) which comes 
from the outside. Comedy, in resisting closure works, then, in a similar way 
to a Brechtian criticism which "transforms finished work into unfinished" 
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ones. 
Unfortunately, it doesn't take long for Gabriel Over the White House to 
lose its satirical tone and sound an unpleasantly shrill pitch. And tellingly, the 
change in tone occurs with the insertion into the narrative of the film's first 
"political speech." The "speeches," as set pieces always delivered as direct 
address into the camera, come across rather like paid political announcements 
(which, I suppose, indeed they are). From the incursion of the first of the 
film's numerous political monologues, Gabriel moves increasingly away from 
an acknowledgment of dialogic speech to a dependence on the monoglot 
(singular in both its discourse and view of the world). Significantly, the film's 
first speech is set up to be delivered not by but at the president by a 
(frighteningly) earnest newspaper reporter who resembles pictures I have seen 
of John Brown, but I assume he represents Hearst's (rather smug) 
misrecognition [méconnaissance] of himself as an Old Testament prophet. 
204 __ Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
The reporter declares: 
My paper's indictment against the government is a staggering one! 
. . . Starvation and want are everywhere. . . [ajstate of misery and 
horror, of lost hope, of broken faith, of the collapse of the American 
Democracy! 
But, for better or worse, things are about to change in the President and for 
the country, and Hearst's rather self-righteous monologues will soon be coming 
out of the mouth of Hammond. One can't help but wonder about this shift in 
the location of the voice of all wisdom, from the newspaper man to the 
president, as it repeats Heart's quite serious, but forever unfulfilled, desire to, 
himself, make just such a move. 
In any event, President Hammond (a pompous politician given to using 
the "Royal We"--he says, for example to "Pendy," "We are the president, are 
we not?") is, moments later, involved in an auto accident that leaves him in a 
coma and Hammond as a "royal we" comes to be literally true as some kind 
of unearthly presence flies through the window to co-inhabit the President's 
body. "Pendy" decides, and of course the film's title announces, that this other 
worldly spirit must be Gabriel (though, in fact, nothing actually confirms this 
and there is some indication that it could be the ghost of Abe Lincoln, or, I 
suppose, any spirit of your choice). Given that in one scene, Hammond, not 
recognizing the words of his own speech, casts his eyes upward to acknowledge 
its "unseen author," I assume Gabriel is, then, Mr. Hearst. 
Be that as it may, the changes in Hammond are immediate and 
dramatic. Hammond now speaks to his staff in a formal style and distant tone 
that is presented as a heavenly produced "professionalism" (a move not 
unknown in the writing and delivery of papers at learned societies). And more 
tellingly, Hammond (now that he is spiritually possessed) represses any 
knowledge that "-Pendy" is his mistress and from that point on refers to her in 
a paternalistic tone, again presented as "professionalism," as "Miss Malloy" 
(a move not unknown in . . .). 
So, the President is soon about his heavenly mission to save the people 
(in Hammond's/[Hearst's] words, the "stupid and lazy people") of the United 
States from themselves by abolishing congress, the cabinet, the court system, 
prohibition (by opening federally owned liquor stores), while bullying the 
"crafty" European politicians into paying their debts and finally to disarm! 
When (heaven forbid) a senator accuses Hammond of having made himself a 
dictator, the President replies, yes, it is a "dictatorship of the greatest good for 
the greatest number!" (Now, if this all sounds a bit like Stalin's perverse 
interpretation of "the dictatorship of the proletariat," the film goes to some 
length to deny the fact, as the leader of the unemployed masses declares, 
"none of us are Reds!") 
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And as far as I know, no one took the film to be "commie" propaganda, 
but The Nation did dub the film "Fascism Over the White House."31 Whether 
fascist or not, the film is undeniably theocratic. Gabriel reflects more the 
arguments that run throughout the Old Testament to validate "charismatic" 
political leadership as superior to the evils of a monarchy, a view that, likewise, 
finds expression in the "adoptionist" Christology of early Christian writings. 
Gabriel, thus, employs not only the theology but the very narrative 
structure of religious myth, for example, the role of an accident or illness as 
occasion for the making of a shaman (Hammond's coma), the period of retreat 
(Hammond stays alone for two weeks meditating on the needs of his people) 
and the denial of sex and earthly pleasure (his emotional withdrawal from 
"Pendy" and his sudden and total sexual abstinence). So, if Gabriel reflects a 
fascist bent (and I think it does), I wonder if it doesn't arise out of Hearst's 
strange desire to return to the discursive regime employed in the royalist 
literature of Cromwellian England, what Foucault, borrowing from Ernst 
Kantotowicz, identifies as a discursive regime founded upon a belief in the 
royal aevum, a holy, mystical, eternal body, a secular perpetuity, a symbol of 
the body politic.32 
Rather than dismiss Gabriel as simply a fascist text, it is perhaps more 
instructive to note how its religio-mythic structure moves the film away from 
the secular heteroglossia of satire and comedy to the sacred 
(theo-phallo-logocentric) monoglot of propaganda and ideological closure. In 
the theocracy, only the voice of "The Law of the Father" speaks and every 
other voice is silenced. As if acting out a divine drama, rather than 
participating in the human comedy, the King is complete in himself. 
As Hammond moves through his "anointed" rounds, the text becomes 
increasingly monoglot, both m fabula and in textual strategy. As the president 
silences his every foe (the congress, his cabinet, the diplomatic corps), the text, 
likewise, with fewer and fewer voices to be heard, moves ever more into 
extended monologues. And as Hammond's political opponents are silenced, 
there remains only three sources from which can emanate another voice: the 
voice of the Other that speaks in crime (the gangster, Nick Diamond), the 
voice of the Other that speaks of revolution (the voices of "the army of the 
unemployed"), and the voice of the Other that speaks in love and desire (the 
president's whore, Miss Pendola Malloy). 
As the film proceeds, the discourse of the criminal is silenced—Diamond 
is executed without trial (the criminal's opportunity to be heard). While the 
voices of "the army of the unemployed" are censored—ever}' reference to 
revolution and violence was expunged by the PCA-the protestors are left little 
to do but march toward Washington singing hymns. Thus the voice of the 
poor is repressed into what Fredric Jameson calls the political unconscious of 
the text, to silently echo, as the text's "absent cause," the "not-revolution that 
has never occurred."33 But still, another voice does remain. What is the film 
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to do with Miss Pendola Malloy, like Madame du Barry, the voice of the 
(King's) whore? 
With this question of what to do with Miss Malloy, we once again 
foreground the issue that has run throughout the previous discussions of 
Madame Du Barry and Dead End. That is, within an economy of meaning 
production, how are classic Hollywood films sites of conflict between the 
various strategies of containment operating to bring about ideological closure 
and the need for a popular film to produce, at the same time, a necessary 
degree of entertainment value? 
For you see, Miss Pendola Malloy can't be so easily silenced. She 
performs an indispensable function within the text: to make the film 
entertaining, to provide Gabriel with some human interest, a little romance. 
And once Hammond has been transfigured into a bonafide prophet-saint with 
little to do but stand and deliver his theocratic monologues, the film must 
develop a minor subplot about a growing romance between Miss Malloy and 
Hammond's assistant, Beekman. (Similarly, we might recall how Cecil B. 
DeMille had to add extra-biblical romance to his remake of The Ten 
Commandments, but then, the addition of some romance and sex was not 
foreign to the writers of the Old Testament, either, in part for the same 
reason, to keep the Law and The Prophets, interesting, entertaining, audience 
centered, more "concrete.") Ironically, as GabriePs text is increasingly given 
over to Hammond's political oratory, the film as even a "slight entertainment" 
is all the more dependent on this wisp of a subplot, and the more we long for 
the voice of Miss Malloy. 
Like the naughty antics of Madame du Barry, and the billingsgate and 
blazons of The Dead End Kids, Gabriel's need for the voice of Miss Malloy 
reminds us that it is within the space created by the audience's desire to be 
entertained, to derive some pleasure from the text, that the struggle against 
ideological closure is often fought. In Gabriel, it is, finally, "Pen-dy" who is left 
to inscribe the film's only concrete (and for that matter, democratic) 
sentiments, a counter-discourse that is heard when she observes that "a simple, 
honest man can do anything." Apparently, if Miss Malloy had been president, 
being herself, a simple, honest whore, neither the angel Gabriel's services nor, 
for that matter, Hammond's theocratic, charismatic discourse would have been 
necessary! Somehow or other, the concrete presence in the text of "Pendy" 
creates a site of possibility that makes not only this "Miracle on Pennsylvania 
Avenue," somewhat beside the point, but Hammond's monotonal monologues 
all the more suffocating (and insufferable). 
Postscript 
Unlike the assumptions of the Frankfurt School and its various latter-day 
descendants, the pleasures of "popular" culture, in particular, the Hollywood 
film, may not only serve as a vehicle for the maintenance of a dominant 
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ideology (which, granted only a fool would deny) but, also at the same time, 
nevertheless provide a site for its resistance. After all, the very necessity of a 
Production Code Administration was an acknowledgment that popular culture 
must be carefully controlled because it tends toward "breaking the rules," of 
"going too far," of suggesting elements of the forbidden, of becoming a whore's 
text. The agency of censorship, as a psychic operation or social practice, exists 
because it never, finally, has its own way, and perhaps, never less so than when 
it exists within a narrative form, one wherein readers will always be tempted 
to take their pleasure where they can. As Annette Kuhn found in her study 
of the problems encountered in the 1920s when sex education on VD was 
framed within a film narrative, a critic of sex education at the time 
complained: 
One has only to listen to the conversation of many of these people 
who believe they [by implication, young and working class] are going 
to see something frankly pornographic!33 
And I bet "they" did! And "we" still do. Just because: in the slip and the 
trace of an elided excess of textual meaning, something now removed, absent 
from the text, but nevertheless present-indeed, always absent because it is 
already present, always present because it is already absent, this 
some-thing-no-thing speaks from an outside deep inside textuality, itself, that 
ever screens (obfuscates and projects) a more extravagant full-ness (personal, 
social, political) "horrible in its desirability." 
Kansas City, Missouri 
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